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Cutting Drag and Increasing Lift:
How Well Will a More Competitive
EEC Air Transport Industry Fly?
Experience with deregulation of the United States airline industry has
produced a number of unexpected consequences. As the European Economic
Community (EEC) moves in the direction of increased competition within its air
transport industry, this U.S. experience may be the best (if not the only)
sounding board for predicting the success or failure of EEC proposals. This
article compares and contrasts the two industries with respect to the effects
attempts at increased competition within the EEC will have, while bearing in
mind that the EEC and U.S. air transport industries are dissimilar in many social
and economic respects. The article focuses on EEC or European Air Transport
organizations only to the extent necessary for the discussion to remain clear and
cohesive.
I. History of European Air Transport
A. CHICAGO CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION
With World War II coming to a close, fifty nations gathered in Chicago in 1944
to enact an international air transport agreement. 1 While reaffirming the airspace
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I. Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S. No. 1591,
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above each nation as sovereign (as adopted twenty-five years earlier in Paris 2),
the Chicago convention established "five freedoms of the air," whereby each
signatory granted: (1) the privilege to fly across its territory without landing; (2)
the privilege to land in its territory for nontraffic purposes; (3) the privilege to put
down passengers, mail, and cargo taken on in the territory of the state whose
nationality the aircraft possesses; (4) the privilege to transport passengers, mail
and cargo destined for the territory of the state whose nationality the aircraft
possesses; and (5) the privilege to transport passengers, mail and cargo destined
for the territory of any other contracting state, and the privilege to put down the
passengers, mail, and cargo coming from any such territory. 3
Protectionism, however, as evidenced in both the Chicago and Paris conven-
tions, ultimately limited the scope of the Chicago convention. 4 As such, the
so-called "Five Freedoms Agreement," as a multilateral agreement, has proven
ineffective, its purposes achievable only through separate, bilateral negotiations
and agreements. 5
B. THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION
Despite the Chicago convention's ultimate inability to establish a multilateral
organ for unrestricted air transportation, it did establish an international
organization to address aviation matters. Focusing primarily on safety and
operational concerns, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO),
while at times succumbing to politicism and protectionism, has been instrumental
in raising and equalizing technical, safety, and operational standards between
member countries.
6
C. THE INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION
In 1945, the International Air Transport Association (IATA) was formed, with
the coordination of international air traffic as one of its primary functions. 7 In the
absence of a workable multilateral agreement among nations, the IATA devel-
oped bilateral agreements among carriers. 8 Over the years, the IATA has become
2. Paris Convention on the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11 L.N.T.S. 173;
Wassenbergh, Regulatory Reform-A Challenge to Inter-Governmental Civil Aviation Conferences,
II AIR L. 31 (1986).
3. Chicago Convention, supra note 1, art. I.
4. D. KASPER, DEREGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION: LIBERALIZING INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AIR
SERVICES 47-48 (1988); Dagtoglou, Air Transport and the European Community, 6 EUR. L. REV. 335,
336 (1981).
5. Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 336; D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 47.
6. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 48.
7. Note, New Frontiers in EEC Air Transport Competition, 8 NW. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 455, 459
(1987).
8. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 49.
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one of the most influential of the world's airline organizations, composed of over
100 air carriers, including eleven of the twelve EEC members.
9
D. EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY
The EEC was established in 1957, when six independent nations in western
Europe entered into a treaty to promote economic expansion, higher standards of
living, and closer relations among member countries. 10 Membership in the EEC
is open to any European nation,'" and the EEC has expanded three times since
its inception. 12 The Treaty of Rome, establishing the EEC, created what have
come to be known as the "Four Freedoms" of the EEC: free movement of
goods, persons, services, and capital. 13 A major thrust of the EEC has been to
create barrier-free internal markets and to prohibit anticompetitive practices
within the EEC.' 4 Of particular importance, article 3 of the Treaty of Rome
seeks to: abolish obstacles to freedom of movement for persons, services and
capital; 15 adopt a common policy for transportation; 16 institute a system to
ensure that competition in the common market air transport industry is not
distorted; 17 and establish procedures to coordinate and remedy disequilibria in
balance of payments.8 Analogous to the "constitution of the EEC," '9 the Treaty
of Rome established the three following independent EEC institutions:
20
The Council of Ministers. The Council of Ministers is comprised of
representatives appointed from each Member State, directly representing their
own States' interests. 2 1 The Council of Ministers has both legislative and
executive powers and is responsible for carrying out the objectives of the
9. Dempsey, Aerial Dogfights Over Europe: The Liberalization of EEC Air Transport, 53 J. AIR
L. & COM. 615, 623 (1988).
10. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11
[hereinafter Treaty of Rome]. Original signatories: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg,
and The Netherlands.
I1. Id. art. 237.
12. Denmark, Ireland, and the United Kingdom became members in 1973; Greece in 1981; and
Portugal and Spain in 1986.
13. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, arts. 48, 52, 59, 67; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 638; Toepke,
The European Economic Community--A Profile, 3 NS. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 640, 643 (1981).
14. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 3; Sutherland, The Competition Policy of the European
Community, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 149 (1985).
15. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 3(c).
16. Id. art. 3(e).
17. Id. art. 3(f).
18. Id. art. 3(g).
19. P. DEMPSEY, LAW & FOREIGN POLICY IN INTERNATIONAL AVIATION 242 (1987); Dempsey, supra
note 9, at 641.
20. For a general discussion of basic EEC institutions and policies, see P.S.R.F. MATHUSEN, A
GUIDE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (4th ed. 1985) [hereinafter MATHUSEN].
21. 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4406.02 (1987); Dempsey, supra note 9, at 670; Toepke,
supra note 4, at 647.
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Community and coordinating the economic policies of the Member States.2 2
To carry out these tasks, the Council of Ministers can issue binding directives,
regulations, and decisions, as well as nonbinding recommendations and
* 23opinions. Regulations automatically become EEC law upon their adoption,
and are applicable to all Member States.24 Directives and decisions are binding
upon those Member States or enterprises to which they are addressed .25 Of
particular importance, title IV of the Treaty of Rome, addressing transport,
tasks the Council of Ministers with developing and implementing a "common
transport policy." 
26
The Commission. The Commission is a nonpartisan, "executive" body that
acts independently, but functions closely with the Council of Ministers. 27 In
very general terms, the duty of the Commission is to ensure the development
of the EEC in conformity with the Treaty of Rome, 28 and administer and
enforce areas of EEC law such as the Treaty's rules on competition. 29 To
achieve these ends, the Commission, like the Council of Ministers, may issue
regulations, directives, decisions, recommendations, and opinions.30
The Court of Justice. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) is comprised of
judges selected from the Member States. 3 It interprets, enforces, and ensures
the application of the provisions of the Treaty of Rome. 32 The ECJ's decisions
have been of great importance in implementing EEC law and systematically
eliminating many longstanding barriers to free movement within the EEC .3 3
The ECJ can decide actions brought by the Commission, the Council of
Ministers, a Member State, or an entity challenging the legality of regulations,
directives, or decisions of the Commission or Council of Ministers. 34 The ECJ
also has jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning the interpretation
of the Treaty of Rome, the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions
of the EEC, and interpretation of EEC legislation.39 Additionally, the courts
22. MATHIJSEN, supra note 20, at 36; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 670; Toepke, supra note 13, at
647.
23. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 189; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 670; Toepke, supra note
13, at 648.
24. Toepke, supra note 13, at 648.
25. Id.
26. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 75.
27. Id. art. 155; 3 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 4472, 4482 (1987); Dempsey, supra note 9,
at 656; Toepke, supra note 13, at 645.
28. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 657; Toepke, supra note 13, at 645.
29. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, arts. 9, 89(2), 90(3), 91(2), 93(2), 97; MATHIJSEN, supra
note 20, at 48.
30. Toepke, supra note 13, at 648.
31. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 167; MATHUSEN, supra note 20, at 56.
32. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 164; Toepke, supra note 13, at 649-50; 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 4600 (1981).
33. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 650; Toepke, supra note 13, at 649.
34. Toepke, supra note 13, at 651.
35. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 177.
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of Member States may refer a question raised in a national judicial proceeding
to the ECJ for a preliminary ruling when no judicial remedy exists under
national law.36
The Treaty of Rome, while containing provisions for establishing a common
transport policy, expressly excluded air transport from the provisions set forth in
title IV (Transport).37 Historically, the IATA has been used to establish a
"common" air transport policy, helping the carriers to establish agreements
governing pricing, tariffs, and capacity. 38 As one commentator has suggested,
the IATA has emerged to play a three-fold role, as: a cartel for airline pricing
agreements; an international airline trade association; and a surrogate for a
multinational governmental agreement. 39 As a result, the air transport industry
within the EEC has remained extremely protectionistic and nationalistic, with
ticket prices increasing steadily over the years in contrast to airline revenues that
have not.40
The state ownership of airlines has been an important factor affecting
regulation of the air transport industry, as the different EEC Member States and
their respective airlines have different abilities to compete in the international air
transport market.4' Allowing the IATA to regulate prices has allowed for fares
high enough to support even the most inefficient of these national carriers, while
allowing national interests to remain prominent in determining Member State
aviation policies and attitudes. 42 Characteristically, licenses and related prereq-
uisites to engage in air transport have been granted exclusively by the national
agencies, and reserved almost solely for national airlines, thus creating, in effect,
national monopolies.4 3
In response to a system weighted in favor of nationalistic policies, inter-State
interests have been balanced through bilateral negotiations covering market
entry, capacity, and price conditions." The freedoms articulated in the Chicago
convention have existed only through the use of these supplemental bilateral
agreements, and "freedom" to transport passengers, freight, and mail between
third countries, as well as international airfares, are coordinated almost exclu-
36. Id.; Toepke, supra note 13, at 651.
37. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 84, provides:
(1) The provisions of this Title shall apply to transport by rail, road, and inland
waterway.
(2) The Council may, acting unanimously, decide whether, to what extent, and by
what procedure appropriate provisions may be laid down for sea and air transport.
38. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 49; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 623.
39. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 49.
40. S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, AIR TRANSPORT IN A COMPETITIVE EUROPEAN MARKET 2 (1986);
Bederman, Prospects for European Air Deregulation, 21 INT'L LAW. 561 (1987).
41. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 50.
42. Id. For the effect inefficient carriers have had on overall fares and services, see Bederman,
supra note 40, at 563.
43. S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at viii; Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 237.
44. Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 336-37.
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sively through the IATA.45 IATA coordination has produced a homogeneous
system of regulating capacity and price, tied exclusively to the constraints of the
carriers' bilateral agreements.46 With policies that are violative of the Treaty of
Rome's provisions on competition,47 historically the IATA has been steadfastly
opposed to a deregulated or liberalized European industry.48
While protectionism and the use of bilateral agreements has fostered higher
prices, the IATA involvement has promoted a highly developed and reliable
international air transport system. 49 In particular, it has made possible "inter-
lining," whereby air tickets paid in the currency of one State are accepted by
most airlines in the world. 50
E. CHARTER AND NONSCHEDULED AIR SERVICE
At the other end of the spectrum, in response to restrictively high prices,
charter airlines have operated in Europe under looser general licensing arrange-
ments and with great success. 51 The very high proportion of European passenger
traffic carried by charter, or nonscheduled services, is a feature that makes the
European air transport industry unique. 52 The multilateral agreements affecting
these nonscheduled or charter carriers have been much less restrictive than the
bilateral agreements entered into by national or larger scheduled carriers.5 3 The
result has been a successful industry within an industry, not unlike the intrastate
growth of PSA and Southwest Airlines, in California and Texas respectively,
during the era of U.S. airline regulation.
54
The IATA world air transport statistics for 1985 show that intra-European
scheduled international traffic was 12 percent of the world's scheduled interna-
tional traffic, while intra-European nonscheduled international traffic in the same
year was 70 percent of the world's total of such traffic. 55 In the previous year,
nonscheduled passenger traffic substantially exceeded scheduled traffic and
accounted for more than 60 percent of the total passenger market for intra-
45. S. WHEATCROFr & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 11; Note, supra note 7, at 459.
46. Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 337; Note, supra note 7, at 459.
47. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 624.
48. Id. at 623; Forrest, Is Open Competition Preferable to Deregulation?, 6 AIR L. 7 (1981).
Mr. Forrest, as then head of IATA Legal Department, touted the IATA as the only practical solution,
disapproving of both competition and regulation.
49. Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 337.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. S. WHEATCROFr & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 21.
53. See European Civil Aviation Conference (ECAC), International Agreement on the Proce-
dures for the Establishment of Tariffs for Scheduled Air Services, 1967; ECAC Multilateral
Agreement on Commercial Rights of Nonscheduled Air Services in Europe, Paris 1956; Levine,
Airline Competition in Deregulated Markets: Theory, Firm Strategy and Public Policy, 4 YALE J. ON
REc. 393 (1987).
54. Levine, supra note 53, at 393, 401.
55. S. WHEATCROFr & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 21.
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European operations. 56 Whatever element of competition that exists within the
EEC air transport industry, particularly with respect to travel on international
routes, has, to a large extent, been made possible by means of bilateral
agreements, as mentioned above, or through nonscheduled charter service. 57
This mix of nationalism, protectionism, scheduled intra-European, and
nonscheduled intra-European air traffic, however, results in an irregular Euro-
pean air transport industry when viewed in the aggregate. 58 The net result, even
with the Chicago convention and its five freedoms of the air, is an industry that
can be competitive in terms of customer service, but that is also overpriced, with
a large portion of the so-called national airlines being subsidized by individual
Member States in order to continue operations.
59
II. Recent Developments
Of late, there have been moves towards more privatization of the European
airline industry. 60 For open commercial competition to thrive, however, the
following aspects of the European air transport system must change: the principle
of complete and exclusive sovereignty over territorial airspace will have to be
weakened; individual States will have to be persuaded to relinquish control over
routes, rights, fares, and rates; and the system of bilateral agreements that has for
so long governed intra-European air transportation will have to be dismantled
and a multilaterally binding regulatory system put into place.
6 1
Over the last ten years, numerous proposals designed to encourage the
Council of Ministers to establish a common transport policy have been
presented.62 The Commission has issued two memoranda, for the Council of
Ministers' adoption, addressing the anticompetitive nature of EEC air transport,
the unsatisfactory progress in developing a common transport policy, and
outlining steps for improvement. 63 Memorandum 164 was issued in 1979, and
56. Id.
57. Bentil, Attempt to Regulate Restrictive Commercial Practices in the Field of Air Transpor-
tation Within a Transnational Antitrust Legal and Institutional Framework, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 69,
70 (1984).
58. Dagtoglou, supra note 4, at 336-38.
59. S. WHEATCROF & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 29; Bederman, supra note 40, at 563.
60. S. WHEATCROFr & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 29; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 618-19,629-
37.
61. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 682 ("Today Phillips, the Dutch electronics firm, can build a
manufacturing facility in Barcelona with relative ease. But if KLM Royal Dutch Airlines sought to
establish hub and spoke operations centered in Barcelona, the Spanish Air Force would likely be
scrambled to escort the KLM jets out of sovereign Spanish air space."); Forrest, supra note 48, at
8, 11.
62. S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at 2-5.
63. MATHUSEN, supra note 20, at 163; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 658.
64. Air Transport: A Community Approach, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES Supp. 5/79 (Memorandum
of the Commission) [hereinafter Air Transport].
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Memorandum 265 in 1984, further developing the guidelines laid down in 1979.
Memorandum 1 pointed out problems with, and made suggestions concerning,
State dominance of the industry, particularly pricing, safety, limited flexibility,
and lack of motivation for change. 66 Memorandum 2 proposed more specific
guidelines, addressed the impact of deregulation in the United States, focused
on increased competition within the EEC air transport industry, and looked at
the EEC improvements in general.67 The Council of Ministers adopted neither
Memorandum, however, and the ECJ, while holding the general provisions of
the Treaty of Rome applicable to air transport, has given the Council of
Ministers broad discretion in implementing the common transport policy.68
Undaunted, the Commission has commenced actions, based on its Treaty of
Rome's article 89 powers, against various EEC airlines to force the abolition of
anticompetitive bilateral agreements and practices. 69 Nothing to this point,
however, has had the impact on the industry as has the decision of the ECJ in the
Nouvelles Frontikres case, which declared the Treaty of Rome regulations
concerning competition applicable to air transport.7 ° Where a common transport
policy had failed to emerge, the substantive provisions of EEC competition law,
contained in articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome, were now in place to
police anticompetitive practices within the EEC air transport industry. 7 1
As with the Chicago convention, however, application of the Treaty of Rome
competition law to air transport has had little overall impact on the protectionist
nature of the European air transport industry, 72 and has left the Commission and
Council of Ministers with various unanswered questions:
65. Progress Towards the Development of Community Air Transport Policy, BULL. EUR.
COMMUNITIES Supp. 3/84 (Memorandum of the Commission) [hereinafter Progress]; Dempsey, supra
note 9, at 657-70.
66. Air Transport, supra note 64, at 7; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 658; Note, supra note 7, at 460.
67. Progress, supra note 65, $ 44, at 27, f 46, at 29; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 658-59; Note,
supra note 7, at 461.
68. Commission v. French Republic, Case 167/73, 1974 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 359, 371, [1974
Transfer Binder] Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8720 (1974).
69. Press Releases IP (87) 343, IP (87) 614; 4 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $$ 10,912, 10,950;
Perrott, Regional Developments: European Communities, 22 INT'L LAW. 1227, at 1230 (1988).
70. Judgment of Apr. 30, 1986, Case 209-213/84, Minist~re Public v. Lucas Asjes, et al., 4
Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 14,287, at 16,774 (1986) (Nouvelles Frontidres addressed the issue of
whether member nations had the right to regulate airline ticket prices after a French travel agency
began selling tickets at fares not approved by the French Govemment). For a brief yet thorough
examination of the case, see Bederman, supra note 40.
71. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, arts. 85, 86; Bentil, supra note 57, at 69, 76-90; Dempsey,
supra note 9, at 638-48.
72. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 656:
The Nouvelles Frontires case, while a philosophical victory for those seeking greater
liberalization, was in fact a practical defeat. Although the court held that arts. 85 and
86 of the Treaty of Rome specifically applied to air transport, they create a right without
a remedy until either the Council of Ministers adopts regulations, or the Commission
issues a reason decision. Nonetheless, the decision intensified the pressure on the
Council of Ministers to promulgate regulations to keep Pandora's box closed.
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(1) What exemptions should be granted to protect legitimate national
interests?
(2) What agreements, otherwise violative of the Treaty of Rome, are
nonetheless desireable?
(3) Will liberalization of the industry raise safety concerns similar to those
raised by observers following U.S. deregulation?
(4) Is there a need for a transition period in applying the Treaty of Rome to
air transport?
(5) If liberalization of the air transport industry brings continued and steady
growth to the industry, how will Member States: (a) expand and improve
an already overtaxed air traffic control (ATC) system; (b) find and train the
pilots necessary for expansion; and (c) decide on where to construct new
facilities to meet the heavy demands expansion would bring?
(6) What will be the long-range effects and unknown costs of international
terrorism against. civil aviation?
(7) To what extent will the varied labor systems within the EEC impede or
affect liberalization?
After years of debate and little action, the Council of Ministers, on December
14, 1987, adopted a comprehensive package of liberalization measures for civil
air transportation designed to abolish anticompetitive practices and agreements,
and meet some if not all of these issues.73
III. What Does the December 14th Agreement Do?
The December 14th agreement expressly applies Treaty of Rome rules of
competition to the air transport sector.74 With particularity, the December 14th
agreement adopts article 87 of the Treaty of Rome, empowering and applying
articles 85 and 86, on competition, to air transportation. 75 Articles 85 and 86
73. 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 1-25 (1987), 3 Common Mkt. Rpts. (CCH) 2767 (the
agreement includes Council Regulation (EEC) No. 975-6/87, Council Directive (87/601/87), and
Council Decision (87/602/87)) [hereinafter December 14th agreement].
74. Id.
75. Id.; Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 87 provides:
(1) Within 3 years of the entry into force of this treaty, the Council shall, acting
unanimously on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly,
adopt any appropriate regulations or directives to give effect to the principles set out
in Article 85 and 86. If such provisions have not been adopted within the period
mentioned, they shall be laid down by the Council, acting by a qualified majority on
a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the Assembly.
(2) The regulations or directives referred to in Paragraph (1) shall be designed in
particular:
(a) To ensure compliance with the prohibitions laid down in Article 85(l) and
Article 86 by making provision for fines and periodic penalty payments;
(b) To lay down detailed rules for the application of Article 85(3), taking into
account the need to ensure effective supervision on the one hand, and a
simplified administration to the greatest possible extent on the other;
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represent the Treaty of Rome's primary "antitrust" provisions; article 85
prohibits agreements, decisions, and concerted practices, and article 86 ad-
dresses dominant market positions and abuses thereof.
76
The December 14th agreement appears to finally give the EEC a workable and
applicable enforcement power to promote competition within the air transport
(c) To define, if need be, in the various branches of the economy, the scope of the
provision of Articles 85 and 86;
(d) To define the respective functions of the Commission and of the Court of
Justice in applying the provisions laid down in this paragraph;
(e) To determine the relationship between national laws and the provisions
contained in this section or adopted pursuant to this Article.
76. Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 85 provides:
(1) The following shall be prohibited as incompatible with the Common Market: all
agreements between undertakings, decision by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices which may affect trade between member states and which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction, or distortion of competition within the
Common Market, and in particular those which:
(a) Directly or indirectly fix purchase or selling prices or any other trading
conditions;
(b) Limit or control production, markets, technical development, or investment;
(c) Share markets or sources of supply;
(d) Apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(e) Make the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
(2) Any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to this Article shall be
automatically void.
(3) The provisions of Paragraph (1) may, however, be declared inapplicable in the
case of
-any agreement or category of agreements between undertakings;
-any decisions or category of decisions by associations of undertakings;
-any concerted practice or category of concerted practices;
Which contributes to improving the production or distribution of good or to promoting
technical or economic progress, while allowing a fair share of the resulting benefit,
and which does not:
(a) Impose on the undertakings concerned restrictions which are not indispensable
to the attainment of these objectives;
(b) Afford such undertakings the possibility of eliminating competition in respect
of a substantial part of the products in question.
Treaty of Rome, supra note 10, art. 86 provides:
Any abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the Common
Market or in a substantial part of it shall be prohibited as incompatible with the
Common Market insofar as it may affect trade between member states.
Such abuse may, in particular, consist in:
(a) Directly or indirectly imposing unfair purchase or selling prices or other unfair
trading conditions;
(b) Limiting production, markets, or technical development to the prejudice of
consumers;
(c) Applying dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage;
(d) Making the conclusion of contracts subject to acceptance by the other parties of
supplementary obligations which, by their nature or according to commercial
usage, have no connection with the subject of such contracts.
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industry. At the same time, the December 14th agreement recognizes the
particular uniqueness of EEC air transport, and some article 85(1) prohibitions
are excepted or exempted (pursuant to article 85(3)) where the sole effect and
objective of the offending agreement is to achieve technical improvements or
cooperation that benefit consumers.
77
A. THE PROCEDURAL PROVISIONS-CouNCIL REGULATION No. 3975/87
The scope of the December 14th agreement is to provide detailed rules for the
application of articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty of Rome to a wide range of air
transport services.78 Nevertheless, the December 14th agreement applies only to
international flights between EEC airports, and does not affect intra-State flights,
or flights originating or terminating in non-Member States. 79 Additionally,
77. Annex to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 8
(1987), provides for the following exemptions pursuant to art. 85(3):
(a) The introduction or uniform application of mandatory or recommended technical
standards for aircraft, aircraft parts, equipment, and aircraft supplies, where such
standards are set by an organization normally accorded international recognition,
or by an aircraft or equipment manufacturer;
(b) the introduction or uniform application of technical standards for fixed installa-
tions for aircraft, where such standards are set by an organization normally
accorded international recognition;
(c) the exchange, leasing, pooling, or maintenance of aircraft, aircraft parts,
equipment, or fixed installations for the purpose of operating air services and the
joint purchase of aircraft parts, provided that such arrangements are made on a
nondiscriminatory basis;
(d) the introduction, operation, and maintenance of technical communication that
works, provided that such arrangements are made on a nondiscriminatory basis;
(e) the exchange, pooling, or training of personnel for technical or operational
purposes;
(f) the organization and execution of substitute transport operations for passengers,
mail and baggage, in the event of a breakdown/delay of aircraft, either under
charter or by provision of substitute aircraft under contractual arrangements;
(g) the organization and execution of successive or supplementary air transport
operations, and the fixing and application of inclusive rates and conditions for
such operations;
(h) the consolidation of individual consignments;
(i) the establishment or application of uniform rules concerning the structure and the
conditions governing the application of transport tariffs, provided that such rules
do not directly or indirectly fix transport fares and conditions;
(j) arrangements as to the sale, endorsement, and acceptance of tickets between air
carriers (inter lining) as well as the refund, pro-rating, and accounting schemes
established for such purposes;
(k) the clearing and settling of accounts between air carriers by means of a clearing
house, including such services as may be necessary or incidental thereto; the
clearing and settling of accounts between air carriers and their appointed agents
by means of a centralized and automated settlement plan or system, including
such services as may be necessary or incidental thereto.
78. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87, supra note 73, art. 1, 30 O.J. EUR. COMM.
(No. L 374) 2 (1987).
79. Id. art. 1, 2.
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among the many exemptions provided, is a rather lengthy list of exemptions for
technical agreements that otherwise would violate article 85(1).80 Such technical
agreements might include: the uniform application of standards for aircraft,
aircraft equipment, or fixed installations for aircraft (where such standards are set
by an international organization or by the manufacturer); the exchange, lease, or
maintenance of aircraft or aircraft equipment, or the joint purchase of aircraft
parts; the operation and maintenance of technical communications networks;
agreements for the training of personnel for technical support; the organization
of supplemental air transport operations; the fixing of rates, tariffs, and
arrangements for the sale, endorsement, and acceptance of tickets between air
carriers; and the clearance and settling of accounts between air carriers. 8 '
B. EXEMPTIONS FOR THE APPLICATION OF TREATY
OF ROME ARTICLE 85(3)-COUNCIL REGULATION 3976/87
In order to ease the transition of the EEC air transport sector toward a more
competitive environment, additional exemptions are allowed to certain catego-
ries of agreements and concerted practices unique to the air transport sector.82
These exemptions are transitional to the extent that the Council of Ministers must
act to revise and extend the exemptions in 1990.83 The exemptions include: joint
planning and coordination for capacity; sharing of revenue (on a very restricted
basis); consultation for common preparation of tariffs, fares, and conditions for
the carriage of passengers and baggage; slot allocations and airport scheduling;
common purchase and operation of computer reservation systems; ground
handling at airports including refueling, cleaning, and security; the handling of
passengers, mail, freight, and baggage; and services for the provision of in-flight
* 84catering.
Important in these measures is that they must be voluntary and allow for
unilateral withdrawal without penalty. 85 Additionally, revenue sharing agree-
ments can be made only for compensations due to losses incurred from
scheduling flights at less busy times or periods, and transfer of funds may be
made in one direction only.86 Notable, and a departure from past practice, is that
the sharing of revenues may not exceed 1 percent of total revenue earned, after
deduction of 20 percent for costs, and neither party may bear any of the other
party's costs.
87
80. Annex to Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3975/87, supra note 77.
81. Id.
82. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3976/87, O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 9 (1987).
83. Id. art. 8, at 11.
84. Id. art. 2, 1 2, at 10.
85. Id.
86. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2671/88, General Exemption Planning & Coordination ofAir
Services, art. 3, 1 I(A), (B), 31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 138) 3 (1988); 3 Common Mkt. Rpt.
(CCH) $ 2758.
87. Id. art. 3, $$ I(C), (D).
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C. SCHEDULING EXEMPTIONS-REGULATION No. 2671/88
The exemptions for negotiations and agreements for slot allocations and
airport scheduling apply only if the consultations are open to all air carriers
expressing an interest in such negotiations. 88 Rules of priority for slot allocation
and airport scheduling cannot be related to nationality or category of service, but
are to be applied without discrimination.
8 9
D. EXEMPTION FOR THE SHARING OF COMPUTER
RESERVATIONS SYSTEMS-REGULATION No. 2672/88
Exemptions are also provided for the common purchase, development, and
operation by carriers of computer reservation systems (CRS) for timetabling,
reservations, and ticketing. 90 Though technically these agreements violate
Treaty of Rome article 85(1), CRS agreements render useful services to carriers,
agents, and most importantly passengers, by giving passengers fuller informa-
tion and choice. 9' In recognition that few individual undertakings will be able to
afford their own systems, an exemption is granted to permit sharing agreements
relating to CRS use, provided such agreements remain unbiased. 92 Of particular
concern is that such agreements not allow a parent company to create any
undue advantages and thereby distort competition. 93 No discrimination may exist
88. Id. art. 5, 1(A).
89. Id. art. 5, 1(B).
90. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2672/88, Group Exemption: Computer Reservation Systems,
31 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 138) 6 (1988); 3 Common Mkt. Rt. (CCH) 2761.
91. Id. (3).
92. Id. (4); Lyle, Computer-Age Vulnerability in the International Airline Industry, 54 J. AIR
L. & COM. 161 n.9 (1988). Two CRS conglomerates currently exist in Europe. The "Amedeus"
system is owned by Air France, Iberia, Lufthansa, and SAS, with software provided by Texas Air's
"System One." "Galileo" is owned by British Airways, KLM, Swissair, and United Airlines' Covia
Corporation. The software system, "Apollo," is provided by Covia Corporation.
93. According to Lyle, supra note 92, at 165-67 (footnote omitted):
The presentation on the screen may be biased, unwittingly or deliberately, both by
the scope of the inventory of flights in the system and by the priority criteria
concerned .... [T]he examples below were . . . taken from actual airline reservation
transactions observed . . . in 1987. ...
The first example involves a trip from Montreal to Barcelona, departing Tuesday,
May 12, using a CRS based in the United States. In response to entry of the origin and
destination cities and the requested date, the CRS displayed the following flight
information on the first "screen," edited here for ease of presentation:
Screen 1
Listing Airline Flight No. Origin Destination Depart Arrive Stops
I Swissair 139 Montreal Zurich 2045 1005#1 0
Swissair 660 Zurich Barcelona 1215 1400 0
2 KLM 674 Montreal Amsterdam 1855 0740# 1 0
KLM 351 Amsterdam Barcelona 1200 1405 0
3 Alitalia 647 Montreal Rome 1515 0925#1 2
Alitalia 356 Rome Barcelona 1055 1235 0
#1 = next day
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There were no through flights listed between Montreal and Barcelona, and the
selected "best" connection was on Swissair via Zurich, followed by a KLM
connection via Amsterdam and an Alitalia connection via Rome.
The similar flight information obtained by scrolling over to the second and
subsequent "screens" is summarized below:
Screen 2 (summary)
Listing
4 Montreal- Barcelona via London Heathrow and London Gatwick
(British Airways plus ground transfer to British Air-
ways)
5 Montreal- Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle and Paris Orly
(Air France plus ground transfer to Iberia)
6 Montreal - Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle and Paris Orly
(Air Canada plus ground transfer to Iberia)
Screen 3 (summary)
Listing
7 Montreal- Barcelona via New York La Guardia and New York
Kennedy (Air Canada plus ground transfer to TWA)
8 Montreal- Barcelona via Boston (Delta to TWA) "No More"
Given the absence of further flight information, the operator next "forced" the
CRS to construct routings from Montreal to Barcelona over Madrid, the major hub in
Spain, with the following results:
Screen 4 (summary)
Listing
9 Montreal- Barcelona via London Heathrow and
Madrid (British Airways to British Air-
ways to Iberia)
10 Montreal- Barcelona via Paris Charles de Gaulle,
Paris Orly and Madrid (Air France plus
ground transfer to Iberia)
Screen 5 (summary)
Listing
11 Montreal- Barcelona via Amsterdam and Madrid
(KLM to KLM to Iberia)
12 Montreal- Barcelona via Zurich and Madrid
(Swissair to Swissair to Iberia) "No
More"
Finally the operator searched separately for Montreal/Madrid Madrid/Barcelona
flights, building up the following legitimate connection:
Screen 6
Listing Airline Flight No. Origin Destination Depart Arrive Stops
13 Iberia 970 Montreal Madrid 1830 0715#1 0
Iberia 740 Madrid Barcelona 0850 0950 0
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between parent carrier and participating carriers to a CRS agreement.94 To insure
competition in what is in effect an oligopolistic market, subscribers must be
allowed to switch systems on short notice, without penalty, and system vendors
may not partition the market.
95
E. GROUND SERVICES EXEMPTIONS-REGULATION No. 2673/88
Additional exemptions will be granted for ground handling services. Though
technically targeted by article 85 of the Treaty of Rome, from a practical stand-
point, ground service agreements produce economic benefits to both air carriers
and passengers and thus help to ensure high quality services, continuity, and
reasonable costs. 96 Ground handling services subject to exemption include: tech-
nical and operational ground handling; handling of passengers, mail, freight and
baggage; and services for in-flight catering. 97 Restrictions on such arrangements
are that there can be no mandatory exclusive dealing contracts, no tying arrange-
ments, no arrangements designed to prevent free choice of services among car-
riers, no unreasonable prices or conditions, no dissimilar prices or conditions
applied to equivalent transactions with different customers, and finally, users must
be free to withdraw unilaterally and without penalty.
98
F. CONDITIONS FOR DISCOUNT FARES-COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 87/601/87
To encourage flexibility and cost controls, procedures for discounting airfares
are also provided by the December 14th agreement. 99 Applicable only to flights
by Member State carriers between Member States, discounts of 90 percent to 45
percent of a reference fare are permitted.'0 0 To qualify, a flight must: pass
By most perceptions this final listing is superior to each of the twelve previous ones.
... [T]he departure time is similar but the origin to destination elapsed times, at nine
hours and twenty minutes, is nearly two hours less than Listing I (Swissair via
Zurich), nearly four hours less than Listing 2 (KLM via Amsterdam), and six hours
less than Listing 3 (Alitalia via Rome) .... Clearly, Iberia is highly vulnerable in this
example. Unless it achieves more favorable listings of its transatlantic service with the
CRS vendor concerned, the airline's access to the Montreal market and possibly other
markets in which this CRS is used will be very limited.
See also Fotos, British Airways Assails U.S. Decision to Void CRS Agreement with American, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 24, 1988, at 78; Commission Press Release P-103 of 26 July 1988, 14
Common Mkt. L.R. 724 [1988 Antitrust Supp.], proposing a "Code of Conduct" for CRS users.
94. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2672/88, supra note 90, (5).
95. Id. arts. 3, 10.
96. Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2673/88, Group Exemption: Ground Handling Services, 31
O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. C 138) 9 (1988); 3 Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 2764.
97. Id. art. 2.
98. Id. art. 1.
99. Council Directive of 14 December 1987 on Fares for Scheduled-Air Services between
Member States (87/601/87), 30 O.1. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 12 (1987) [hereinafter Council
Directive 87/601/87].
100. Id. art. 2. The reference fare is based on the economy fare for a particular route as
established by third- or fourth-freedom carriers.
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through the air space of more than one Member State; make available seats for
passengers on each flight; and operate between the same two points either
according to a published schedule, or so regularly as to constitute a recognizable
systematic series. 101 Subject to certain restrictions, 10 2 carriers are then able to
[A] third-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having the right to put down, in the
territory of another state, passengers, freight and mail taken up in the state in which
it is registered; a fourth-freedom air carrier means an air carrier having the right to take
on, in another state, passengers, freight and mail for off-loading in its state of
registration.
101. Id. art. 2(h)
102. Common Market Threats Force Carriers towards Liberalization, AvtATION WEEK & SPACE
THCH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 148-49 [hereinafter Common Market Threats]; Council Directive 87/601/87,
supra note 99:
Annex 1I
Conditions for discount and deep-discount fares
DISCOUNT ZONE
1. To qualify for the discount zone all of the following conditions must be met:
(a) round or circle trip;
(b) maximum stay of six months; and either
(c) minimum stay of not less than Saturday night or six nights or(d) if off-peak (as defined in the Appendix) advance purchase of not fewer than 14
days, reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the
same time, cancellation or change of reservation only available prior to
departure of outbound travel and at a fee of at least 20% of the price of the
ticket.
DEEP-DISCOUNT ZONE
2. To qualify for the deep-discount zone, a fare must meet:
- either conditions I(a), (b) and (c) find one of the following conditions:
(a) reservation for the entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the
same time, cancellation or change of reservation only available prior to
departure of outbound travel and at a fee of at least 20% of the price of the
ticket;
(b) mandatory advance purchase of not fewer than 14 days, reservation for the
entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation
or change of reservation only available prior to departure of outbound travel
and at a fee of at least 20% of the price of the ticket;
(c) purchase of the ticket only permitted on the day prior to departure of
outbound travel, reservation to be made separately for both the outbound
and inbound journeys and only in the country of departure on the day prior
to travel on the respective journeys;
(d) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or not less than 60 years;
- or, if off-peak (as defined in the Appendix), conditions 1(a) and (b)
together with:
- either condition 2(b) and one of the following conditions:
(e) passenger to be aged not more than 25 years or not less than 60 years;
(f) father and/or mother with children aged not more than 25 years travelling
together (minimum 3 persons);
(g) 6 or more persons travelling together with cross-referenced tickets; or
(h) mandatory advance purchase of not fewer than 28 days; reservation for the
entire trip, ticketing and payment to be made at the same time; cancellation
or change of reservation only available:
- if more than 28 days before outbound travel, at a fee of at least 20% of the
price of the ticket, or
- if fewer than 28 days before outbound travel, at a fee of at least 50% of the
price of the ticket.
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discount airfares on scheduled air service in either a discount zone (90 percent to
65 percent of reference fare), or deep discount zone (65 percent to 45 percent of
reference fare). 103
G. CAPACITY SHARING AND MARKET ACCESS-
COUNCIL DECISION 87/602/87
Finally, the December 14th agreement contains provisions for sharing of
passenger capacity between air carriers of Member States, and access for EEC air
carriers to certain international routes they do not already operate. 1° 4 In
addressing capacity sharing, the Council of Ministers has attempted to relax
artificial constraints that bilateral agreements have imposed on capacity. 105 As
such, the traditional 50-50 percent split of capacity has been replaced by a 55-45




An air carrier may designate certain flights as "off-peak" on the basis of
commercial considerations.
When an air carrier wishes to use condition 1(d) or any of conditions 2(e) to (h),
identification of the off-peak flights for each route shall be agreed between the
aeronautical authorities of the Member States concerned on the basis of the proposal
made by that air carrier.
On each route where the total activity of third- and fourth-freedom air carriers
reaches a weekly average of 18 return flights, the air carriers concerned shall be
allowed as a minimum to apply conditions 1(d) or 2(e) to (h) on up to 50% of its total
daily flights, provided that the flights to which these conditions may be applied depart
between 10.00 and 16.00 or between 21.00 and 06.00.
103. Id. art. 5.
104. Council Decision of 14 December 1987 on the sharing of passenger capacity between air
carriers on scheduled air services between Member States and access for air carriers to scheduled
service routes between Member States (87/602/87), 30 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 374) 19 (1987)
[hereinafter Council Decision 87/602/87].
105. Id.
106. Common Market Threats, supra note 102, at 148; Council Decision 87/602/87, supra note
104, art. 3, at 19 (Shares of Capacity):
1. In the period between 1 January 1988 and 30 September 1989, a Member State
shall allow any third- and fourth-freedom air carrier(s) authorized by the States
concerned under the arrangements in force between them to operate routes between
their territories to adjust capacity provided that the resulting capacity shares are not
outside the range 55%:45%.
2. Unless a different decision is taken under Article 4, the range within which a
Member State shall allow the air carrier(s) of another Member State to increase its
(their) capacity share shall be extended to 60%:40% from I October 1989.
3. In applying the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2, unilateral cutbacks in capacity
shall not be taken into account. In such cases, the basis for the calculation of capacity
shares shall be the capacity offered in the previous corresponding seasons by the air
carrier(s) of the Member State which has (have) reduced its (their) capacity.
4. Adjustments within the 55%:45% range or the 60%:40% range, as appropriate,
shall be permissible in any given season, under the following conditions:
(a) after the first automatic approval, the air carrier(s) of the Member State
offering less capacity shall be authorized to increase its (their) own capacity
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The decision also establishes opportunities for carriers to enter routes that,
based on the number of passengers carried, allow for "multiple designation" on
both a "country-pairing" basis and a "city-pairing" basis. 107 Furthermore, the
decision creates additional market access between hub and regional airports. 108
up to the limit of the capacity approved for the air carrier(s) of the Member
State offering the larger capacity;
(b) if the latter air carrier(s) choose(s) to react to the above mentioned increase,
it (they) shall receive automatic approval for one further increase, up the level
of its (their) first capacity filing(s) for that season, within the applicable range;
(c) the carrier(s) of the Member State offering less capacity will then receive
automatic approval for one increase up to the matching level;
(d) any further increases during that season shall be subject to the applicable
bilateral provisions between the two Member States concerned.
Article 4
1. At the request of any Member State for which the application of Article 3(1) has
led to serious financial damage for its air carrier(s), the Commission will carry out a
review before 1 August 1989 and, on the basis of all relevant factors, including the
market situation, the financial position of the carrier(s) and the capacity utilization
achieved, will take a decision on whether the provisions of Article 3(2) should be
applied in full or not.
2. The Commission shall communicate its decision to the Council which, acting by
unanimity, may take a different decision within a period of two months of this commu-
nication.
107. Common Market Threats, supra note 102, at 148-49; Council Decision 87/602/87, supra
note 104, art. 5, at 22 (Multiple Designation):
1. A Member State shall accept multiple designation on a country-pair basis by
another Member State but, subject to paragraph 2, shall not be obliged to accept the
designation of more than one air carrier on any one route.
2. A Member State shall also accept multiple designation on a city- pair basis by
another Member State:
-in the first year after the notification of this Decision, on routes on which more
than 250,000 passengers were carried in the preceding year,
-in the second year, on routes on which more than 200,000 passengers were carried
in the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,200 return flights per annum,
-in the third year, on routes on which more than 180,000 passengers were carried in
the preceding year or on which there are more than 1,000 return flights per annum.
3. The provisions of this Article are subject to those in Articles 3 and 4
108. Council Decision 87/602/87, supra note 104, art. 6 (Routes Between Hub and Regional Airports):
1. Subject to the provisions of Articles 3, 4 and 5, Community air carriers shall be
permitted to introduce third or fourth freedom scheduled air services between category
I airports or airport systems in the territory of one Member State and regional airports
in the territory of another Member State. Airport categories are listed in Annex II.
2. (i) The provisions of paragraph I shall not apply:
(a) to regional airports exempted from the provisions of Directive 83/416/EEC;
(b) for the duration of this Decision to:
- the following airports which, at the time of notification of this Decision,
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Finally, the decision permits the entry and operation of "fifth-freedom"' 0 9
- the following airports or airport systems which at the time of the notification of




(ii) In addition, in order to prevent major disturbance of existing air traffic systems
and to allow time for adaptation, the following airports shall also be excluded





3. Articles 3 and 4 shall not apply to services between an airport in category I and
a regional airport which are provided by aircraft with not more than 70 passenger seats.
4. Where an air carrier of one Member State has been authorized in accordance with
this Article to operate a scheduled air service, the State of registration of that air carrier
shall raise no objection to an application for the introduction of a scheduled air service
on the same route by an air carrier of the other State concerned.
5. The provisions of this Article shall not affect a Member State's right to regulate
this distribution of traffic between the airports within an airport system.
Annex II
List of Airport Categories




Spain: Palma-Mallorca, Madrid-Barajas Malaga, Las
Palmas
Greece: Athens-Hellinkion, Salonica-Micra






United Kingdom: London-Heathrow/Gatwick/Stansted, Luton
Category 2 Germany: Hamburg-FuhlsbUttel, Stuttgart-Echterdingen,
Cologne/Bonn
Spain: Tenerife-Sur, Barcelona, Ibiza, Alicante, Ger-
ona
France: Marseilles-Marignane, Nice-C6te d'Azur,
Lyon-Satolas, Basle-Mulhouse
Ireland: Shannon




United Kingdom: Manchester-Ringway, Birmingham-Elmdon,
Glasgow-Abbotsinch
Category 3 All other airports officially open to international scheduled services.
Note: Category I airports are those traditionally referred to as "hub" airports.
109. Council Decision 87/602/87, supra note 104, art. 2(d): "[A] fifth-freedom air carrier means
an air carrier having the right to undertake the commercial air transport of passengers, freight and
mail between two States other than the State of registration."
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schedule air service, subject to certain restrictions. l10
The Council of Ministers' decision does not prevent Member States from
concluding or maintaining arrangements more flexible than the provisions of the
decision.'' The decision must not, however, be used to make existing market
access and capacity arrangements more restrictive. 112
IV. Member State Preparation for Liberalization
These extensive exemptions, though some are transitional in nature, are more
easily understood when the characteristics that distinguish the European airline
industry from industries in other regions of the world are taken into consider-
ation. These characteristics include government ownership, government subsidy,
pooling arrangements, dissimilar labor policies, extensive nonscheduled ser-
vices, and highly effective and competitive surface transportation facilities. 113
The role that government ownership and subsidy plays is varied, and historically
has had a significant effect on both competition between carriers and earnings of
individual carriers.' 14 Governments support their national airlines for many
reasons, and in many ways, including direct or indirect capital, loans, guaran-
tees, preferential treatment, and waiver of landing and navigation charges."1
5
Realistically, even with exemptions, competition cannot be expected to work
effectively without some controls on government aid. Absent such controls,
110. Council Decision 87/602/87, supra note 104, art. 8, at 22-23, (Fifth-Freedom Rights):
1. Without prejudice to Article 6(2), a Community air carrier shall be permitted to
operate a fifth-freedom scheduled air service where third- or fourth-freedom traffic
rights exist, provided that the service meets the following conditions:
(a) it is authorized by the State of registration of the Community air carrier
concerned;
(b) it is operated as an extension of a service from, or as a preliminary of a service to,
its State of registration;
(c) without prejudice to paragraph 2, it is operated between two airports at least one
of which is not a category I airport; and
(d) not more than 30% of the carrier's annual capacity on the route concerned may be
used for the carriage of fifth-freedom passengers.
2. Subject to paragraphs I(a), (b) and (d), Ireland and Portugal may each select one
category I airport in each of the other Member States and may each designate an air
carrier to carry fifth-freedom traffic on services between those airports, provided that
neither of the air carriers so designated may exercise such rights at any one airport on
more than one such route. The Member States concerned need not designate the same
carrier for all routes but may for this purpose designate only one carrier to each other
Member State.
3. This Article shall not apply during the period of validity of this Decision to routes
to or from Spanish territory. Similarly, during the same period air carriers registered
in Spain may not claim fifth- freedom rights on the basis of the provisions in this Article.
Ill. Id. art. 10(l).
112. Id. art. 10(2).
113. N. TANEJA, THE INTERNATIONAL AIRLINE INDUSTRY 58 (1988).
114. Id. at 59.
115. Id.
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governments may be tempted to finance competition, and competition could
become what has been described as "a subsidy race."" 6 Fortunately, the
Nouvelles Frontikres decision and the December 14th agreement appear to have
accomplished two goals: they empower the EEC to take direct action against the
airlines, and they force EEC Member States to comply with, and develop, EEC
regulations. 7 These advances should encourage more privatization of the
industry, as is evidenced by a number of Member States, the United Kingdom
most prominently, actively promoting change and increased privatization of
State-owned airlines." 
8
Of interest is the IATA's shift from air coordination activities to new
self-sustaining services." 9 Less than a decade ago the head of the legal
department of the IATA presented the view that competition between scheduled
carriers was not an option, and that carriers had no alternative to continued
shepherding by the IATA. 120 The current Director General of the IATA has
recognized that increased competition among IATA members is inevitable.' 2 1
Among some of the new services and developments offered by the IATA are hull
and liability insurance for members, and a centrally operated fares data base
called Airline Industry Management Systems (AIMS). 122 The IATA is also in the
process of developing a new currency system originally scheduled to go into
effect in 1989.123 Under the new system exchange rates and currency adjustment
factors will be abolished, and fares will be set in the currency of the country of
origin or in U.S. dollars. 124 Finally, to meet the demands of rapidly increasing
data processing requirements, the IATA is developing a universal computer
language to facilitate access between systems. 125
Many individual carriers, as well, are preparing for increased competition in
the EEC market. As an example, SAS and Texas Air have recently negotiated an
interairline partnership agreement. 126 Under the terms of the agreement, SAS
would take a 10 percent equity interest in Texas Air, while Texas Air Corp. would
gain $50 million from SAS as an entry level fee for access to Texas Air facilities
in the United States.1 27 As part of the agreement, Texas Air's "System One"
116. Id.
117. Id. at 71.
118. Id. at 59-60, 71.
119. Shifrin, Competitive Airline Market Spurs IATA to Develop New Services, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Nov. 16, 1987, at 45.
120. Forrest, supra note 48, at 8.
121. Shifrin, supra note 119, at 45.
122. Ott, IATA Strives to Centralize Airline Tariff Information, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
Aug. 22, 1988, at 112; Shifin, supra note 119, at 45.
123. Shifrin, supra note 119, at 46.
124. Id.
125. Ott, supra note 122, at 112; Shifrin, supra note 119, at 46.
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computer reservation system will be merged with the "Amadeus" System
operated jointly by SAS and a number of other European airlines. 128 As part of
the agreement, SAS and Texas Air will share airline computer reservation system
codes ("code sharing") allowing a flight between Scandanavia and the United
States to be booked through one carrier, while having SAS as the transatlantic
carrier, and a Texas Air subsidiary (Continental or Eastern) the carrier for
connecting flights within the United States.1 29 SAS and Texas Air will share
ground support equipment and facilities, and SAS is expected to continue to
expand its "hub-and-spoke" operations through similar partnerships or agree-
ments in the future.'
30
Lufthansa, as well, has made a number of recent moves in anticipation of
liberalization and increased competition in the industry. Among the most
significant are the upgrade of its fleet to meet projected changes that increased
competition will bring,' 3' and its "Futura" program, developed in cooperation
with Swiss Air and Iberia, for the joint training of new pilots to meet expected
growth within the industry.'
32
V. Parallels to U.S. Deregulation-What Can Be Expected
Many commentators have been quick to note that the uniqueness of the EEC
airline industry makes a U.S. type of deregulation unrealistic.' 33 As recent
studies have shown, however, the net effect of U.S. deregulation is very far from
a model of "pure" competition.' 34 Among some U.S. deregulation attributes
that a liberalized EEC industry might take on, and that might even be encouraged
by the December 14th agreement and its exemptions, are:
(1) increased mergers, resulting in a more oligopolistic or concentrated
market, and the growth of "megacarriers";
(2) expansion of the "hub-and-spoke" system;
(3) increased pressure on airlines to reduce operating costs;
(4) increased linking of computer-type or nonscheduled operations to major
carriers;
(5) a broader spectrum of price and service options;
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. id. at I10-11
131. Lufthansa Sets Fleet for 1990s with Order for 737 - 500s, - 300s, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 28, 1988, at 91; Common Market Threats Force Carriers Toward Liberalization,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 9, 1987, at 146.
132. European Liberalization Will Raise Pilot Demand, Prompt Cooperation, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE ThCH., June 13, 1988, at 123.
133. S. WHEATCROFT & G. LIPMAN, supra note 40, at x; Dempsey, supra note 13, at 684; see also
remarks of Commissioner Davis, Sept. 11, 1985, disapproving of a U.S. type "market free-for- all,"
4 Common Mkt. Rpt. (CCH) 10,726 (1985) [hereinafter Commissioner's Remarks].
134. Levine, supra note 53, at 408.
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(6) a decline in the share of traffic carried exclusively by charters or
nonscheduled carriers;
(7) code sharing, and sharing of CRSs; and
(8) significant vertical network integration of the entire industry. 35
What probably will not be seen is many European countries allowing their
national airlines to fail completely, especially on the scale that major carriers
failed following U.S. deregulation.' 36 As a result, if the U.S. experience with
"merge or fail" is impeded by a government that will not surrender a national
carrier, the national carrier may be forced to scale operations back significantly
and accept being relegated to a restricted regional or intra-State role.1
37
Mergers between carriers of different States, creating carriers similar to SAS,
may be an option, especially in distinctly defined geographic areas such as the
Iberian Peninsula, where Portugal's TAP and Spain's Iberia Airlines could be
merged into a truly "Iberian" airline. 138 In any event, the December 14th
agreement, like U.S. deregulation, is not so much airline deregulation, as a step
towards a type of forced oligopoly, modified for increased competition, on a
scale that addresses the unique characteristics of the European airline industry.
Congestion and Control. An existing problem facing the European airline
industry that will be aggravated by EEC liberalization will be the worsening of
an already congested air traffic control (ATC) system. The existing ATC system
is dangerously close to saturation, 139 and no significant short-term changes can
be expected due to the long lead time required to initiate needed changes. 140 The
Association of European Airlines (AEA) has characterized the European air
transport system as close to stagnation, with its future in jeopardy unless
improvements to the ATC system are soon made. 141
As an example of the urgency of the problem, the AEA cites its own statistics
for 1986 showing the length of delays for flights originating from the United
Kingdom, France, and Luxembourg increasing 186 percent, and the number of
delayed flights increasing 39 percent. 142 Additionally, there were 300,000 more
European flights in 1987 than in 1986, and the number of passengers carried is
expected to double by the year 2000 to reach 540 million passengers a year. 143
AEA figures for combined European traffic for the first three months of 1988
135. Id. at 423.
136. The Dallas Morning News, Oct. 23, 1988, at 1-A, col. 1, H-I, col. 6; Dallas Times Herald,
Oct. 23, 1988, at A-1, A-14-15; see also Commissioner's Remarks, supra note 133.
137. N. TANEJA, supra note 113, at 105.
138. Id. at 75.
139. Airlines Warn of Crippling Congestion Unless Europe Upgrades ATC Systems, AVIATION
WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 6, 1988, at 92 [hereinafter Crippling Congestion].
140. Lenorovitz, Authorities Address Europe's Air Traffic Control Crisis, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TtCH., June 6, 1988, at 86.
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show an increase of well over 15 percent for the same period in 1987, and the
trend has continued through 1989.144
To help counter the immediacy of this problem, eighteen of the twenty-two
European countries belonging to the European Civil Aviation Conference
recently approved wide-ranging recommendations for near- and medium-term
upgrades of the ATC system. ' 45 The focus of the conference was to: develop
short-term plans that can be instituted quickly, while long-range plans are being
developed; ensure that EEC policies for liberalization are coherent with ATC
system upgrades and operations; and attempt to reverse a trend by the IATA and
other organizations of projecting unrealistically low growth rates, which histor-
ically have made planning difficult. 1
46
Safety. Airline safety is also a valid concern as the EEC air transport industry
is liberalized. Both the increase in competition and the integration of commuter
and nonscheduled carriers following U.S. deregulation have been the focus of
safety concerns by many U.S. industry observers. The period following U.S.
deregulation has, however, been a period of safe operations relative to the years
preceding deregulation. 147 Though the accident rate for large scheduled U.S.
airline traffic was up slightly for 1987, 1987 was nonetheless the seventh safest
year since 1926, when air safety regulation began in the United States.'
48
Additionally, in 1987, general aviation recorded its safest year overall since
1967.149 From 1970 through 1987 the U.S. air transport industry has seen seven
of its safest years in the past sixty-one years, leading to the conclusion that
deregulation, of itself, has not made air travel more unsafe. 150
Nevertheless, the commuter airline segment of the U.S. industry has experi-
enced a rise in its accident rate in recent years. '5' Among some of the factors that
attributed to this increase are tighter budgetary constraints as the commuters
attempt to compete with larger, established carriers, and less experience and
proficiency in airline maintenance and piloting skills. 152 The nature of the
commuter or nonscheduled carrier and its operations, however, makes the general
144. Flight Delays Plague European Airlines as Summer Season Starts, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., June 26, 1989, at 93; European Airline Traffic Grows, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 6,
1988, at 86.
145. Lenorovitz, supra note 140, at 86.
146. Id. IATA projected growth has been about 5.5 percent a year, Eurocontrol (European ATC
authority) projections have been between 4-7 percent, while actual growth has been between 12-15
percent. See also European Airlines Will Study Forming a Single ATC System, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., Feb. 27, 1989, at 71 [hereinafter Study].
147. U.S. Airline Accident Rate Up Slightly in 1987, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 25,
1988, at 150 [hereinafter Accident Rate Up).
148. Id.; General Aviation Records Safest Year Since 1967, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 25,
1988, at 150 [hereinafter Safest Year].
149. Safest Year, supra note 148, at 150.
150. Id.; cf. Goetz & Dempsey, Airline Deregulation Ten Years After: Something Foul in the Air,
54 J. AIR L. & COM. 927, 956 (1989).
151. Accident Rate Up, supra note 147, at 150; Proctor, FAA's Findings Reveal Commuter Airline
Problems, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Oct. 3, 1988, at 105.
152. Proctor, supra note 151, at 105.
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industry practice of using accident per passenger mile to compile these statistics
somewhat misleading. 153 The commuter segment of the industry is varied, and
as a general rule the commuter carrier makes far more takeoffs and landings per
passenger mile (the most critical phase of any flight) than the large scheduled
carrier, while operating out of smaller and more poorly equipped air fields.' 
54
Statistically, based on takeoffs and landings, U.S. commuter or nonscheduled
carrier traffic is slightly less safe than that of the large scheduled carriers, but is
probably not the weak link in the industry that many analysts had forecast. 155
In any event, liberalization of the EEC industry is likely to increase the use by
national carriers of medium- and short-haul commuter-type aircraft, and the
integration of the nonscheduled carrier into the major scheduled carrier
system.' 56 If the U.S. experience is a reliable barometer of the effects of
increased cooperation in the airline industry, it is apparent that the smaller
carriers will have to associate themselves in some way with the major carriers to
survive increased competition.1 57 Some strong ties already exist between a
number of major European carriers and regional carriers, and a number of major
European airlines, faced with a more competitive industry, have either begun
discussions with regional carriers for the cooperative integration of routes and
schedules, or have created their own commuter units. 158
Almost certainly, consolidations, mergers, and heavy vertical integration will
occur within the industry, 159 and those medium- to small-sized carriers unable or
unwilling to merge or enter cooperative agreements will, over the long haul,
fail. 160 Existing large carriers, as well, will have to be more conscious of and
sensitive to cost factors, including matching suitable configurations of aircraft to
their scheduled routes. 161
An increase in failures in the industry due to increased competition does not,
however, necessarily mean that increased competition is "bad" or should be
avoided. While a fair number of U.S. carriers, some of substantial size, failed
following U.S. deregulation, entrants into the industry since deregulation have
153. Oster & Zorn, Deregulation and Commuter Airline Safety, 49 J. AIR L. & CoM. 315, 325
(1984).
154. Id. at 325-26.
155. Id.
156. Increased Traffic and Deregulation: A Growing Market, AVIATIoN WEEK & SPACE TECH.,
June 20, 1988 at 61 [hereinafter Increased Traffic]; Levine, supra note 53, at 409-10; SAS Establishes
Commuter Unit, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Mar. 28, 1988, at 91 [hereinafter SAS]; Lufthansa
Plans Strategy for 1990s, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Nov. 29, 1987, at 148 [hereinafter
Lufthansa].
157. Increased Traffic, supra note 156, at 62; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 684. But see Mordoff,
Aero Lloyd to Begin Scheduled Flights in Competition with Lufthansa, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Aug. 15, 1988, at 122.
158. Increased Traffic, supra note 156, at 62; Lufthansa, supra note 156; SAS, supra note 156.
159. Dempsey, supra note 9, at 684; Levine, supra note 52, at 409-10.
160. Levine, supra note 53, at 406; Dempsey, supra note 9, at 684-85. But cf. Mordoff, supra
note 157 (former German charter carrier begins scheduled service in direct competition with
Lufthansa).
161. Levine, supra note 53, at 407.
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been able to achieve unit costs substantially below those of the carriers that
failed, and even below those of holdovers from the pre-deregulation era.' 62 In
addition, although no one can predict with any certainty the effects on safety of
competition between carriers that survive or enter the market, such competition
will not necessarily lead to a lowering of industry safety. 1
63
Note should be given, however, to the view expressed by Professors Dempsey
and Goetz' 64 as to the overall effects competitive pressures have had on the U.S.
industry's "margin of safety."'165 Competitive fares and cost-cutting have
increased congestion and contributed to a 21 percent increase in the average age
of aircraft in service while the resources devoted to maintaining the industry's
aging fleet have fallen (30 percent during the first six years of deregulation). 166
Placing this combination into an over-taxed ATC system may have long-term
effects on safety not measurable by current statistical methods. 167
A previously "lethargic"1 68 FAA is beginning to take a more active role in
addressing this problem, 169 possibly in response to criticism that it is ill-equipped
to handle the needs of a growing, competitive industry. 170 In addition to these
factors, the EEC is faced with the challenge of determining which of the existing
national and international entities concerned should take the lead in coordinating
European efforts to maintain the "margin of safety" in a more competitive
environment. 171
Mergers and Integration. Of the numerous changes prompted by U.S.
deregulation, perhaps the most dramatic trends have been toward vertical
network integration, code sharing, and a rapid growth of the "hub-and-spoke"
type of route system.' 72 Vertical integration, code sharing, and "hub-and-
spoke"operations are all closely intertwined and are a direct result of more
competitive, and more economic, scheduling and route schemes. 173 This type of
scheduling and route structure provided benefits for both the large and small
carrier, as well as for the passenger. Hubbing provides passengers with relatively
convenient connecting flights when originating or terminating a flight in an area
not served by a major air facility. It also allows the large carrier to combine
162. Id. at 406-07.
163. Cf. Oster & Zorn, supra note 153. But see Dempsey, supra note 9, at 684.
164. Goetz & Dempsey, supra note 150.
165. Id. at 956-58.
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 956.
169. See, e.g., Mecham, FAA Hiring Field Inspectors to Monitor Aging Aircraft, AVIATION WEEK
& SPACE T CH., Apr. 24, 1989, at 110; Ott, FAA Will Test Wayport Concept as Remedy to Airport
Congestion, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., Jan. 9, 1989, at 64.
170. See, e.g., ATA President Blasts U.S. Government's Failure to Reform Aviation Agency,
AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 1, 1989, at 105.
171. As a possible step in that direction, see Study, supra note 146.
172. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 30-34; Levine, supra note 53, at 437.
173. D. KASPER, supra note 4, at 30; Levine, supra note 53, at 439.
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passengers from different points of origin while providing an economically
attractive means of serving the smaller spoke cities (often through the use of
vertical network agreements). Code sharing allows prospective passengers to
schedule and book the entire flight under the name of one major carrier. As a
result, frequent and convenient jet service is now available between paired cities
whose traffic density would otherwise not support it. 174
While these developments occurred in the United States as a result of market
factors and economies of scale, and not necessarily as a result of any scheme
conceived prior to U.S. deregulation, the December 14th agreement contains
express provisions and exemptions that allow, and possibly even encourage,
vertical networks, code sharing, and "hub-and-spoke" route systems. 175 A
major aspect of the December 14th agreement is that it provides through article
85(3) exemptions sufficient flexibility across the board to allow for agreements
that, while flying in the face of a pure competition model of industrywide
deregulation, are both beneficial and necessary when considering the varied
economic and social factors facing the EEC in making the air transport industry
more competitive.' 76 In addition, unlike the U.S. experience,17 7 the December
14th agreement, as implemented by the EEC,17 8 takes steps to preserve entry
level opportunities and avoid excessive market dominance at hub facilities;
something that unrestricted competition might otherwise foster.' 79 The overall
effect should be the avoidance of absolute regional dominance by existing
carriers-something that has limited market entry in the United States ' 8 0 -that
would ultimately limit the gains sought by increased competition
VI. Conclusion
Due to the diversity within the EEC and the many factors that distinguish it
from the United States, care must be taken in any comparison of U.S.
deregulation and the liberalization of the EEC air transport industry. In addition,
the EEC's target date of 1992 for the creation of a unified internal market and
Single European Act, pose constraints on industry liberalization probably not
174; Levine, supra note 53, at 441.
175. See supra notes 89-90, 103-07 and accompanying text.
176. See supra notes 74, 79-95, 101-07 and accompanying text.
177. Goetz & Dempsey, supra note 150, at 931-43; Ott, Senate Panel Widens Probe of Airline
Concentration, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 12, 1989, at 312; Skinner Calls USAir in Bid for
More Philadelphia Gates Anti-Competitive, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., June 5, 1989, at 110; Ott,
Congress Seeks Remedies to Concentration at Hubs, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECH., May 8, 1989, at
100; Mecham, Justice Dept. Vows Stronger Antitrust Policy on Mergers, AVIATION WEEK & SPACE
TECH., Mar. 13, 1989.
178. Common Market Begins to Wrestle With Rules to Govern Competition, AVIATION WEEK &
SPACE TECH., June 12, 1989, at 93-95 (Commission has required the forfeiture to small carriers of
landing slots and routes as a condition to merger approval).
179. See supra note 177.
180. Id.
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present in any form in the U.S. industry experience.18' While the deregulated
U.S. industry has undoubtedly experienced an increase in efficiency, some
interesting deviations from a pure competition model have emerged, including
complex fare structures, extensive use of CRS, extensive vertical integration,
and "hub-and-spoke" domination. 182 The EEC, through the December 14th
agreement, appears to have allowed for these deviations, recognizing them as
important and inevitable in implementing a plan calling for increased competi-
tion, while at the same time guarding against some of the less desirable effects
pure competition might encourage. The agreement also seems to address the
varied economic and social conditions within the EEC's Member States, the EEC
air transport industry, and the effect these differences might have on liberalizing
the industry and promoting competition.
181. Creation of Internal Market, I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 202.07 (1978); Single
European Act, I Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 101.15 (1978).
182. Levine, supra note 53, at 408.
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